

ACORD, ACTIONAID, ONE, OXFAM, PAF

**THE DRAFT CAADP 10-
YEAR RESULTS
FRAMEWORK:**

**Comments from Non-State
Actors**

DRAFT

Mark Curtis
7 April 2014

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents our comments and inputs into the draft CAADP Results Framework. We welcome the Results Framework as an important potential tool in promoting agriculture in Africa under the auspices of CAADP. We believe there are several positive and welcome features of the current draft Results Framework:

- the very identification of key result areas is positive, in that it will help to hold governments to further account for their agriculture policies
- the emphasis on areas such as sustainable natural resources management and land tenure security in the Result Areas/Indicators is welcome
- in particular, the recognition that governments should ‘stop selling arable land for fuel at the expense of agriculture’ is also welcome (p.8)

The rest of this briefing focuses on improvements that in our view need to be made in the Result Framework. Our view overall is that the draft as it currently stands is more of a missed opportunity to help improve African agriculture policies. The paper currently omits some key principles and issues that in our view will severely limit the positive impact that such a tool could bring. It also contains some elements that are likely to hold back pro-poor agricultural development.

1. ANALYSIS OF THE INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

The Introduction to the paper is useful in stating the importance of increasing attention to agriculture now and in outlining the rationale for the key result areas. This section is also noteworthy in mentioning four vital issues in particular: the importance of promoting

- national policies on 'women and youth' (p.9)
- national policies on climate change (p.9)
- decentralised decision making (p.9)
- empowering people (farmers) 'to unleash their own potential' (p.8)

However, despite these four areas being vital, they are subsequently barely addressed at all in the Result Areas/Indicators, as we analyse in section 2.

One other major problem with the Introduction, and indeed rest of the document, is that it does not state who the main agents in, and beneficiaries of, agriculture policy are meant to be. We believe that **smallholder farmers** - the overwhelming majority of farmers in Africa, who produce most of the continent's food and are home to most of Africa's poor people - must be explicitly identified as both the primary agents in, and beneficiaries of, agricultural development. The draft mentions smallholder farmers only in passing in the main text (p.9) and mentions them only twice in the entire Result Areas/Indicators (Table A2, sections 2.1.2 and 2.3.2).

Our concern is not so much with the number of mentions but with mainstreaming a focus on smallholders in government agriculture strategies. This is important as it is often unclear for whom agriculture policies have been developed. The Results Framework could help governments do this by explicitly identifying smallholders as the primary agents and beneficiaries and in elaborating on this in various of the Result Areas and Indicators.

We have further comments on Section 1.3 of the draft. This includes examples of (a) good things that governments are doing and should continue (b) bad things that should be stopped and (c) things that are not happening and that Africa should start doing. This section is

refreshingly honest and is welcomed. However, it presents a too rosy picture of current agriculture policy in Africa.

Examples of 'good things' described in the draft are 'increased investments' in agriculture and renewed 'vigour and attention to gender equality'. Yet both of these present a very mixed picture.

- As regards increased **investments in agriculture**, this is true of some states. But many African governments (examples include Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia) have not increased their agriculture spending in recent years as a proportion of national spending, despite the CAADP 10 per cent target. Only seven states (Ethiopia, Niger, Mali, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Guinea) have consistently reached the 10 per cent target.¹ We do not believe it is correct to identify increased investments in agriculture as a thing that African governments generally are currently doing.
- As regards **gender equality**, although some states (most notably perhaps Rwanda) now recognise women farmers as key actors in agriculture policies, they are generally still being largely ignored by governments in practice. In agriculture budgets, women remain largely invisible; although some projects benefit women farmers, there are almost no budget lines specifically targeting them.² A recent review by ActionAid of seven African governments' agriculture budgets and policies found that gender commitments remain largely on paper only.³ Again, we do not believe it is justified to praise African governments for their current approach to gender equality.

Section (c) (things that are not happening and that Africa should start doing) is unfortunately only a partial list and in our view does not include the most important gaps in current agriculture policy. As well as insufficient investments in agriculture, and the lack of prioritisation of women farmers, other major things not happening include:

- insufficient investments in public extension services
- the lack of sufficient spending on agro-ecological approaches
- insufficient support to farmers organisations and seeing them as the primary agents in agricultural development
- a lack of an adequate focus on nutrition as part of agriculture strategy
- inadequate focus on ensuring land tenure security for smallholders, especially women

2. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND INDICATORS

Before coming to the substantive issues, three general comments on the headings in the Results Framework in Figure 2 (page 13):

- These headings (and some of the indicators) do not all correspond to the headings in the Results Areas tables on pages 30-35. It is unclear why not, and this is confusing.
- Section 3.5 of Figure 2 is headed: 'Increased (public/private) investment financing across all components of the agricultural value chain'. Yet in Table A3 (p.35) this is headed: "Increased (public/private) investment financing in agriculture achieving better value for money'. We believe the second form of wording is more appropriate because we do not believe that there should necessarily be increased private investment across all components of agriculture. Private investment may not be appropriate at all in some policy areas.
- Two Result Areas in Level 3 appear to amount to the same thing: section 3.1 covers 'improved and inclusive policy design and implementation capacity for agriculture', while section 3.3 covers 'more inclusive and evidence based agriculture planning and implementation processes'. The distinction between these two is unclear and they could be merged.

2.1 Cross-cutting issues

As noted above, the Introduction to the draft mentions four vital issues (concerning gender, empowerment, decentralisation and climate change) but which are then barely addressed in the Result Areas/Indicators.

Women farmers

The draft states on page 9 that 'informed and deliberate overarching national policies on women and youth' (and climate change) will be

developed. This is welcome, yet the draft and the Result Areas/Indicators otherwise barely mention women. A general problem is that the draft does specify that women constitute the majority of farmers in most African countries (see Box 1), a fact that is important to capture since this should affect numerous policies, strategies and budgets. African policy-makers need to make the leap towards understanding that the majority of farmers are not men and that much policy needs to be different towards women than men. Policies and budgets need to reflect the fact that women are the primary producers of food and managers of nutrition for the majority of Africa's people.

As regards the Result Areas/Indicators, 'gender' is mentioned only twice (in sections 1.4.1, measuring the vulnerability to shocks, and section 2.4.4, measuring land size under secure land tenure). Many other indicators should also be gender-disaggregated, notably sections 1.2.1 (rate of poverty reduction rural areas), section 3.3.1 (inclusiveness of system of planning) and section 3.6.1 (research products adapted for improved agricultural productivity). Women need to be explicitly targeted in such policies; otherwise the risk is that they will continue to be ignored.

Box 1: Importance of women in farming

Burundi	Women account for 55% of the workforce ⁴ and do 70% of farm work ⁵ .
Ghana	Women constitute over half of the agricultural labour force and produce around 70% of the country's food. ⁶
Kenya	Women account for 75% of the labour force in small-scale agriculture, manage 40% of small farms and play the major role in food preparation and storage. ⁷
Nigeria	Women constitute 60–80% of the agricultural labour force ⁸ and are responsible for carrying out 50% of animal husbandry related activities and 60% of food processing ⁹ .
Rwanda	Women contribute up to 70% of agricultural labour ¹⁰ and do 80% of the sowing, 65% of food processing, 61% of hoeing and 72% of the storage and transportation of produce ¹¹ .
Uganda	Women constitute 55% of farmers ¹² , head 26% of households in rural areas and do 85% of the planting and

	weeding, 55% of land preparation and 98% of the food processing ¹³ .
Zambia	Women comprise around 65% of smallholder farmers ¹⁴ , are the main producers of food and manage, either independently or jointly, around 60% of the land under maize production ¹⁵ .

Top-down policy-making

On page 8, the draft crucially states:

‘CAADP should be more about shifting the mind-set from attempts to deliver agriculture development to the people - to empowering people to unleash their own potential’.

We could not agree more. However, the Results Areas/Indicators do not follow up this crucial notion, but instead convey that agriculture policy will continue to be promoted in an essentially top-down fashion. The Results Areas/Indicators do focus on improving inclusivity and accountability (again both extremely important and welcome) but the sense is only on improving the capacity and political will of governments to promote better agriculture policies. Nowhere in the Results Areas/Indicators is it conveyed that farmers themselves are to be regarded as the primary drivers of agriculture policy. Farmers’ organisations are mentioned only once here: in section 3.5.3, which refers to ‘Number of functioning farmer/ commodity associations, cooperatives and SMEs business organisations (for bulking)’. Thus smallholder farmers are not regarded as active participants and there is no measurement of empowering farmers’ organisations to design, promote and lead agriculture strategies.

The constructive involvement of non-state actors in key decision making has been generally lacking under CAADP. The second generation of CAADP must have at its centre a reaffirmation of the founding CAADP principle of ‘inclusive participation’; through this, governments can better serve their populations, improve results, and make the sector more dynamic and sustainable.

Additional indicators should include:

- ‘% of government agriculture spending on empowering farmer organisations’,

- ‘extent to which farmers organisations have designed and implemented agriculture budgets and policies’,
- ‘number of functioning women-led farmer organisations involved in policy and budget design’.
- ‘extent of involvement of other non-state actors in the design and implementation of plans and budgets’

Moreover, we believe that ‘empowerment of farmers’ should be an additional full result area under Level 1, alongside wealth creation, improved security etc.

Decentralisation

The draft states (page 9) that:

‘... decentralisation making processes which empower sub-national right down to community level actors will be cardinal in ensuring that the impact of agriculture growth reaches wider and local communities, including smallholder farmers’.

Such decentralization is important for budgets and policy-making to be closer to the beneficiaries (ie smallholder farmers). Currently, agriculture budgets in many countries are highly centralised with central ministries of agriculture controlling most of the funds. However this important recognition is not matched in the Result Areas/Indicators: decentralisation is not mentioned there.

An additional indicator should be:

- ‘% of agriculture budget spent at local level’.

Climate change adaptation

The draft states on page 9 that ‘informed and deliberate overarching national policies’ will be developed on climate change. This is important and adapting to climate change will be an increasingly critical factor in improving farm productivity in Africa. Yet the Result Areas/Indicators make no mention of enabling farmers to adapt to climate change.

An additional indicator here should be:

- ‘Number and % of smallholder farmers supported in climate change adaptation programmes, disaggregated by gender’.

In addition to the four areas mentioned above, there are several other gaps in the Result Areas/Indicators:

Inclusivity/accountability

Level 3 of the Results Framework places a considerable emphasis on inclusivity and accountability, which is greatly welcome. Annex 3 contains further useful examples of indicators and interventions on these issues. However, it is not clear who will be involved in such inclusive policies; neither is it clear to whom institutions will be accountable. The answer in both cases should, in our view, be primarily smallholder farmers, especially women. But this is not clear from the Results Framework. Annex 3 points again to more top-down decision-making, in stating (page 41) that agricultural policies should have ‘buy in and internalization across key stakeholder and interest groups’. Again, a leap is required to turn away from improving top-down policies to promoting bottom-up policies and to ensure that inclusivity involves smallholder farmers and that governmental institutions are accountable to them. These concerns should be reflected in the Level 3 indicators, to which we return in the comments on Level 3 in the next section.

Seed

Farmers’ access to local/traditional varieties of saved seeds through, for example, community seed banks, is critical to smallholder farming. The Results Areas/Indicators make only one mention of seed – section 2.1.5 which measures ‘change in input use’ including seed. The assumption here seems to be that farmers are to be measured by their increasing use of ‘improved’ seeds, likely to mean hybrid or even GM seeds, which are expensive to small farmers and reinforce their dependence on multinational suppliers. This is entirely the wrong approach, in our view.

A better indicator should be:

- ‘% of farmers with adequate access to local, saved seeds’

Extension services

Extension services receive scant mention in the draft – only on page 43, and no mention in the Results Areas/Indicators. Public investment in extension is currently woefully inadequate and has fallen out of favour, often due to donor opposition. Yet farmers’ access to advisory and training services – especially farmer-to-farmer approaches whereby farmers learn from each other – is more vital than ever: this is especially the case with regard to climate change adaptation where local farming knowledge is vital. There is a particular need to increase women farmers’ access to extension services.

Additional indicators should include:

- ‘% of government spending on agriculture devoted to extension services’,
- ‘% of farmers, with access to regular, quality extension services, disaggregated by gender’,
- ‘% of female extension officers’.

2.2 Specific comments on the Result Areas/Indicators

Level 1, indicator 1.4: ‘Resilience to stresses and shocks’

The indicators here emphasise national policies (on disaster risk management and social protection) only, but policies/budgets at local level are also crucial, especially when it comes to implementing local level disaster risk management strategies.

An additional indicator here should be:

- ‘Local/regional plans/capacity in place to support communities affected by shocks’.

Level 1, result area 1.5: Environmental sustainability

Although ‘environmental sustainability’ is mentioned as a result area in Figure 2, it is absent from Table A1, and should be added, together with indicators.

Level 2, result area 2.1: 'Increased agriculture production and productivity'

This section would be better entitled: 'Increased sustainable agricultural productivity'. The emphasis on increased production distracts attention from the importance of improving storage and the distribution of food. With some countries suffering 30-40 per cent post-harvest losses in their farm production, increased production is not the key need. Equally, most countries produce enough food at the national level; the problem is that distribution and consumption is highly unequal. The emphasis by multinational companies and some donors on Africa's need to massively increase food production is misplaced. Storage is rightfully recognised as a key area in section 2.4.5.

An additional indicator could be:

- '% of post harvest losses of farm production'.

Level 2, indicator 2.1.5: 'Change in input use (fertilizer, mechanisation, seed and other purchased inputs)'

We strongly disagree with this indicator for a number of reasons. First, we do not believe that increases in chemical fertilizer use (which we assume is what is being referred to) is a proper measure of improvements in farm productivity. Chemical fertilizers are expensive for farmers and can have severe environmental impacts. African governments should not place emphasis on increases in the use of chemicals being pushed by multinational companies and some donors. Rather, governments should, in our view, be encouraging and funding agro-ecological agriculture, and the promotion of organic fertilizers.

Second, this indicator refers to the importance of 'other purchased inputs', yet much vital organic fertilizers can be found on-farm or elsewhere locally; agriculture must not be measured by the degree to which farmers purchase inputs. Again, this is a strategy being pushed by multinational suppliers of chemicals and seeds. Equally, this implies that seed will be purchased, ignoring the importance of saved seed, noted above.

Third, measuring mechanisation can also be inappropriate. Access to tractors is usually more beneficial to large scale farmers than smallholders, so the number of tractors available for agriculture in a country is often meaningless in gauging the potential impacts on

smallholder farming. Of far greater importance would be access to simple, less expensive labour-saving technologies (such as small-scale irrigation equipment, improved hoes and grinding machines). However, these receive no mention in the draft.

More appropriate indicators should include:

- ‘% of farmers with access to sufficient quantities of organic fertilizer’,
- ‘% of farmers with access to improved labour-saving technologies, disaggregated by gender’.

Level 2, indicator 2.2.1: ‘Input marketing functioning; ease of doing business in agriculture index’ and Level 2, indicator 2.6.3: ‘Ease of doing business in agriculture index’

The World Bank’s doing business in agriculture index is in our view a wholly inappropriate indicator for measuring how smallholders can gain from agriculture policy. The Doing Business project generally is regarded by most NGOs as reinforcing a neo-liberal model of development divorced from the needs of the majority of the world’s small businesses.¹⁶ The specific doing business in agriculture project – which aims ‘to inform and to leverage policy reforms which lead to a more modern agriculture sector, built primarily on the basis of commercial viable family farms’ – also appears to be aimed mainly at private agribusiness investors, and promotes neoliberal land policy and further deregulation of the agricultural sector. The project fails to demonstrate how farmers will benefit from the benchmarking of the agricultural sector in their own country.¹⁷ These indicators should be removed.

Level 2, Result area 2.2

Some of indicators in this section are about promoting export agriculture (indicator 2.2.2 on ‘volumes traded cross border’ and indicator 2.2.4 ‘Africa’s share in global agriculture trade’) which we believe are largely meaningless to smallholder farmers. More important is access to local markets and increases in farm production sold in local markets on the part of smallholders. More relevant indicators would include: ‘% of farmers with access to markets within 5kms’ and ‘% increase in smallholder farmers’ farm production sold in local markets’.

Level 2, indicator 2.3.2: 'Agri-entrepreneurial capacity of smallholder farmers and SMEs'

We are not clear how this indicator can be measured since it seems vague - how is it possible to measure such 'capacity'? An alternative indicator could be:

- 'Increase in % of smallholder farmers engaged in value-added activities'.

Level 2, indicator 2.4.1: '% of public budget spent on agriculture related investment financing...'

We agree that it is important to measure public expenditure spent (ie, disbursed) as well as allocated. This indicator should clarify that it will measure both. In addition, it is vital that governments set a timetable for reaching the 10% commitment; these commitments, and progress towards them, should be reflected in the indicators.

Level 2, indicator 2.4.3: 'Share of international investments (FDI) in agriculture and agribusiness'

We do not believe this is a useful indicator. For one thing, FDI can simply displace domestic investment (through takeovers), meaning that the country does not necessarily benefit. For another, FDI in agriculture (and other sectors) can have adverse impacts as much as positive ones. A \$100 million investment in a land grab that displaces 10,000 farmers and pollutes local rivers does not benefit the country by \$100 million, hence capturing the level of such investments is misleading. We do not believe that government commitment to smallholder agriculture - which should be the key measure - can be captured by an indicator measuring changes in FDI.

Level 2, indicator 2.4.4: 'Land size under secure land tenure by local populations (segregated by gender)'

We agree with this and regard it as important. However, it would also be useful to measure the increase in the percentage of farmers with secure land tenure and the percentage of women-headed households with secure land tenure.

In addition, there is a need to ensure that governments prevent land grabs and one important way to do so is to adopt and implement the Voluntary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure. We therefore recommend that an additional indicator be included to reflect this.

Level 2, indicator 2.4.5: 'Annual investments in new rural roads, agriculture-related ICT and agricultural produce storage capacity'

We do not disagree with the importance of measuring these but question why these investments are covered here and not others. In our view, the indicators should cover a range of other investments by governments, principally in extension services, agricultural research, agro-ecology, women farmers, labour-saving technologies and farmer organisations. We believe that indicators on these areas should be added, covering the % of government spending devoted to these areas.

Level 2, sections 2.3.1 ('Volume change in micro-financing accessed by SMEs') and section 2.4.6 ('Access to loans by agriculture-based SMEs')

These would appear to be largely the same and could be merged.

Level 2, result area 2.5: 'Sustainable natural resources management (environmental resilience)'

We welcome the focus in the Result Areas/Indicators on sustainable natural resources management. We believe that governments must prioritise agro-ecology and make far greater investments in this area, which means reducing the focus on chemicals, and putting in place strategies to do so. We would suggest additional indicators here:

- '% of the agriculture budget allocated to/spent on agro-ecological approaches'
- '% reduction in the use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides'.

Level 2, indicator 2.5.1: 'Hectares of land protected or restored under agro-ecosystems'

We agree with this indicator and believe it is vital. However, it will be important to define what is meant by 'agro-ecosystems'. An additional indicator should be:

- '% of farmers practicing agro-ecological farming on their land'. This would help measure the extent to which agro-ecology approaches are growing in the country.

Level 3, result area 3.1: 'Improved and inclusive policy design and capacity for agriculture'

We welcome the focus on inclusivity. However, as noted above, it is unclear who should be the object of this inclusivity. Our view is that smallholders, and farmers' organisations, should participate in, indeed take the lead in, designing and implementing agriculture policies. Non-state actors must be systematically involved in decision-making.

An indicator here should be:

- 'Extent of proactive involvement of smallholder farmers' organisations in annual national and local/regional programming and budgeting'.

Level 3, result area 3.2: 'More effective and accountable institutions to drive the planning and implementation of public policies...'

We welcome the focus on accountability. However, the indicators outlined in the draft do not promote the accountability of policy-makers to smallholder farmers. In particular, there needs to be significantly increased transparency concerning agriculture budgets and spending; currently, some countries publish annual agriculture budgets in an extremely limited form, and some (for example, Nigeria) not at all. There are also few independent reviews of agriculture spending that take into full account the perspectives of smallholder farmers. In addition, as also noted above, decentralised policy-making is important to bring policies and budgets closer to farmers.

Additional indicators here should include:

- 'Annual publication of an easily-accessible detailed agriculture budget, broken down by sub-sector and local/regional level',
- 'Regular commissioning and publication of review of agriculture policy and budget',

- (as noted above) ‘% of the agriculture budget spent at local level’.

Level 3, result area 3.4: ‘Improved coordination, partnerships and alliances within and across sectors and countries’

One major current problem with ministries in the agriculture sector, mainly the result of insufficient funding, is the lack of adequate capacity to carry out planned tasks. Often, a large proportion of posts are unfilled, sometimes co-existing with too many administrative jobs. A related problem is that a very high proportion of budgets is allocated to salaries, leaving few resources for operations and projects.

Additional indicators should be:

- ‘% of dedicated posts filled in ministries in the agriculture sector’
- ‘% of budget in ministries in the agriculture sector allocated to operations/projects’.

Level 3, result area 3.5: ‘Increased (public/private) investment financing in agriculture achieving better value for money’

In this section one indicator (3.5.1: ‘Mechanisms for leveraging additional public and private financing – including PPPs’) refers to PPPs as does Annex 3 at page 42. The latter places great emphasis on PPPs, mentioning the importance of increasing investment by PPPs and to ‘review policy and regulatory environment for PPPs and recommend improvements’. PPPs are the latest fad of donors and are now being widely promoted through mechanisms such as the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. If they are designed in participatory ways, with intended beneficiaries closely involved, PPPs could have positive impacts. However, they also have inherent dangers, and in many recent cases of land investments (land grabs) had adverse impacts on smallholder farmers since they are often part of a process of opening up agricultural sector (including land) to foreign investors with little regulatory control or safeguards for smallholders. PPPs also represent a potential danger in being seen by governments as an alternative to increased public investment. We welcome the fact that PPPs receive just one mention in the Result Areas/Indicators but are concerned that the emphasis on PPPs in the Annex does not sufficiently address the potential problems associated with current PPPs.

Level 3, indicator 3.5.2: 'Taxation and interest rates on agriculture inputs and product'

It is unclear exactly what this means. If, however, it is a pointer towards reducing taxes on imported chemical fertilizers and pesticides, we do not believe this is an appropriate indicator since this would encourage the use of such chemicals and in effect provide a public subsidy for them. We suggest this indicator needs clarification, and that tax policy needs to be consistent with promoting agro-ecological approaches to farming.

Level 3, indicator 3.5.4: 'Quality of public agriculture plans and budgets'

This indicator appears to be vague. Who judges on 'quality'? The main agents should be smallholder farmers, who should also be the key beneficiaries of such plans and budgets. This needs to be clarified in the indicators.

Level 3, indicator 3.6.1: 'Research and innovation products adapted for improved agricultural productivity'

It is surprising that this is the only mention of research in the Result Areas/Indicators, given the well-understood role that agricultural research can play in improving agricultural productivity. Although Annex 3 (at page 43) mentions increasing investment in research, the Result Areas/Indicators do not. As noted above, an additional indicator should be:

- ' % of government agriculture spending allocated to research'.

The nature and approach of agricultural research is also critical since much research is currently top-down, is divorced from farmers' needs, does not involve smallholders, especially women, and is disseminated poorly. The section on research in Annex 3 (page 43) does nothing to reassure readers that the same problems will not continue. It mentions 'informing and supporting farmers' and 'capacity building for knowledge sharing by stakeholders' but does not mention participation of farmers, women farmers or a focus on prioritised needs.

Additional indicators here should include:

- 'Extent to which farmers organisations are involved in the design and dissemination of research products'
- 'Number of farmers involved in farmer-to-farmer research and extension processes'.

REFERENCES

- ¹ FAO, *The State of Food and Agriculture 2012: Investing in Agriculture*, p.26
- ² See, for example, ActionAid, *Fertile Ground: How governments and donors can halve hunger by supporting small farmers*, April 2010
- ³ ActionAid, *Walking the Talk: Why and How African Governments Should Transform Their Agriculture Spending*, December 2013
- ⁴ Republic of Burundi, *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, September 2006, p.38
- ⁵ IFAD, *Republic of Burundi: Country Strategic Opportunities Programme*, September 2008, p.1
- ⁶ SEND, 'Putting words into action: Strategic financing of smallholder agricultural development for food security and poverty reduction', undated
- ⁷ Patrick Alila and Rosemary Atieno, 'Agricultural Policy in Kenya: Issues and Processes: Paper for the Future Agricultures Consortium', IDS/University of Nairobi, July 2006, pp.4, 12
- ⁸ 'Nigeria: Women in Agriculture', in World Bank, *Sharing Experiences—Examples of Participating Approaches, The Participation Sourcebook*, 2003, <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publications.htm>
- ⁹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, *National Gender Policy*, 2006, http://www.aacoalition.org/national_policy_women.htm
- ¹⁰ AfDB, *Rwanda Gender Assessment: Progress Towards Improving Women's Economic Status*, 2008, p.20, <http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/rwanda/>
- ¹¹ AfDB, *Rwanda Gender Assessment: Progress Towards Improving Women's Economic Status*, 2008, p.21, <http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/rwanda/>
- ¹² MAAIF, *Statistical Abstract 2011*, p.vii; MAAIF, *Agriculture Sector Development Strategy and Investment Plan, 2010/11 - 2014/15*, July 2010, p.30
- ¹³ Forum for Women and Democracy (FOWODE), *Gender Policy Brief for Uganda's Agriculture Sector*, 2012, pp.4-8
- ¹⁴ Republic of Zambia, *Sixth National Development Plan, 2011-15*, January 2011, p.108
- ¹⁵ African Development Bank, *Republic of Zambia: Multi-Sector Country Gender Profile*, April 2006, p.10
- ¹⁶ See, for example, the joint NGO publications here: <http://www.cafod.org.uk/Media/Files/Resources/Policy/Doing-Business-extra>
- ¹⁷ See 'Our land, our business', <http://ourlandourbusiness.org/reports-and-info/read-the-report/>